Circular financing, on-balance-sheet & off-balance-sheet debt, GPU-backed debt, potential rapid deleveraging, repricing of assets…. It’s all there.
By Wolf Richter for WOLF STREET.
The risks associated with the AI investment boom – funded by a borrowing boom, circular financing, leverage, and sky-high equity prices – has been the talk of the town for a while. The Federal Reserve has also been warning about the financial stability aspects of this boom if and when it goes awry, particularly in its latest twice-a-year Financial Stability Report (FSR), released on Friday.
Fed Governor Michael Barr today fleshed out in a long speech the AI-related risks to financial stability – and they’re big, complex, and opaque. Here are 10 of those risks, in Barr’s own words:
1. AI investment losses could hit economy.
“In one possible scenario among several, even if AI turns out to be a transformative innovation that vastly improves productivity, a key question is whether investors will see returns on the AI buildout on a timeline and to an extent consistent with their expectations or whether a different outcome could lead to a significant repricing.
“The potential investment losses that could result from a large-scale repricing could lower output growth in two ways: first, from the direct effect of a drop in investment, which is a component of gross domestic product; and, second, from the knock-on effects of this loss of wealth in lowering consumer and potentially business spending.
2. Debt, circular financing, and other complex financial obligations.
“The Federal Reserve’s FSR [Financial Stability Report] delves into three ways in which the financing of AI data centers and related investments, which it calls “advanced computing debt,” could affect financial stability:
- the rapid growth of this debt,
- circular financing networks,
- other complex financial obligations.
“In the case of a significant repricing of AI investments, stress from these three aspects of AI financing could amplify the repricing of AI investments.”
3. $800 billion on-balance-sheet debt at largest AI companies:
“On-balance-sheet debt of the seven largest AI firms has been growing significantly in 2026 and is expected to exceed $800 billion before year’s end.
“The growth of debt at these firms brings to mind the growth of debt in the telecom investment cycle of the late 1990s and early 2000s…. While the hyperscalers have yet to surpass their comparators of the earlier boom, the recent acceleration in their capital expenditures suggests they may do so soon.”
4. $3 Trillion opaque off-balance-sheet debt at largest AI companies:
“While these firms’ on-balance-sheet debt levels have grown substantially, their other obligations, such as long-term contracts, lease commitments, and residual value guarantees, have grown even more rapidly.
“The FSR estimates that the potential maximum nominal value of these types of obligations, or off-balance-sheet liabilities, now exceeds $3 trillion.
“A significant share of these obligations results from complex arrangements in which hyperscalers and other large firms with strong credit ratings indirectly support the financing of projects that involve other firms with weaker credit, or provide support for public utility investments.
“These off-balance-sheet liabilities include obligations relating to energy supply contracts, long-term data center and compute leases, and a wide variety of off-balance-sheet financing structures….
“This financial complexity can be opaque to unsophisticated investors, and that opacity can exacerbate selloffs when investor sentiment shifts, as it is hard to know where risk resides….
“Perhaps just as important, in addition to the hyperscalers, lower-credit-quality firms most dependent on external funding have seen their cost of capital rise significantly in recent months and, as a result, are turning to more complex asset-backed financings.”
5. $100 billion of circular financing at smaller firms.
“The hyperscaler firms and large graphics processing unit (GPU) producers also have over $100 billion in cumulative equity investments in large language model (LLM) labs and cloud-computing start-ups.
“These equity investments represent a form of “circular financing” in which hyperscaler firms and GPU makers invest capital in smaller firms, and the smaller firms turn around and use these funds to rent or purchase GPUs and compute from the firm that made the investment.
“These investments represent a relatively small share of the hyperscalers’ and GPU producers’ balance sheets, but they are critical for the smaller firms receiving the investments.
“For the AI buildout investments to ultimately become economically viable, the smaller firms will eventually have to replace that funding from their suppliers, the hyperscalers and GPU makers, with revenue from paying customers.”
6. GPU-based asset backed circular financing.
“Another indirect form of circular financing in which the hyperscalers and GPU producers support purchases of their products and services is the use of collateral guarantees for asset-based financings.
“As the firms most dependent on external financing bump up against financing constraints, they shift from issuing corporate bonds to issuing asset-based financing. To support the credit of these financings, the larger higher-credit firms often guarantee the resale value for the data centers or GPUs that are used as collateral to back the financings.
“These guarantees, or collateral backstops, are reported as off-balance-sheet liabilities because they represent the degree to which hyperscalers and GPU producers might absorb losses in the event of defaults and collateral liquidation.”
7. Potential “rapid deleveraging.”
“Given the still-limited amount of debt backing the current boom, I’m less concerned about direct losses.
“However, with leverage at hedge funds and broader risk appetite apparently quite high, a sharp reversal could lead to rapid deleveraging and, potentially, self-reinforcing fire sales.
“Further, the leverage used in equity strategies has also increased in recent years. This leverage is provided, in part, via the prime brokerage services of large dealers. Thus, while the high levels of capital at the largest banks provide a bulwark against spillovers, counterparty exposures could rise in a period of equity market volatility, so it’s important to keep monitoring exposures, including exposures to counterparties that have taken large positions in AI.
8. Rapid depreciation of the GPUs backing the debt.
“Moreover, the bulk of a data center’s cost comes from the GPUs and other specialized chips used in AI.
“One concern is that these specialized chips may depreciate quickly as newer technologies overtake them, such that the capacity they represent will not be of much use in the future.”
9. Potentially useless electrical infrastructure.
“It is hard to say what the other parts of the AI-related capital stock—substations, high-voltage connections, and grid interconnection—may be used for if demand for their services disappoints.
“In some areas of the country, no doubt, extra power and network capacity will be useful regardless of the future of AI.
“In other areas, it may take years for excess capacity to become useful, as was the case with ‘dark fiber’ in some areas after the 1990s boom and bust.”
10. Securities trading by AI: “Market Herding and a Possible Stampede.”
“If traders rely on a small set of similar AI models trained on similar data, they face the risk of herding behavior—trading strategies could become similar and synchronize reactions to news and other information.
“Algorithm flaws can cause failures, but a market with large numbers of similar models that may have the same flaw risks failures with systemic consequences.
“Moreover, bad actors could intentionally manipulate trades, quotes, or news and potentially mislead similar AI trading systems at the same time, amplifying market disruptions.
“AI models may echo unfortunate human tendencies. For example, some theoretical research shows that some reinforcement-learning algorithms, so called Q-learning trading algorithms, can autonomously develop collusive behavior without explicit intent.
“Such self-learning algorithms can also autonomously learn to manipulate markets—for example, through spoofing, which is placing orders designed to create a false impression of market demand—or adopt trading strategies that create and exploit bubbles, thereby destabilizing markets.”
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